Recently, Kempf and Koodli have proposed a security protocol for Fast Mobile IPv6 (FMIPv6). Through the SEcure Neighbor Discovery (SEND) protocol, it achieves secure distribution of a handover key, and consequently becomes a security standard for FMIPv6. However, it is still vulnerable to redirection attacks. In addition, due to the SEND protocol, it suffers from denial of service attacks and expensive computational cost. In this paper, we present a security protocol, which enhances KempfKoodli's one with the help of the AAA infrastructure.
Introduction
Fast Mobile IPv6 (FMIPv6) becomes vulnerable to various attacks if it is not secured [1] . For example, an attacker can redirect a victim mobile node's traffic at will by using a forged FastBindingU pdate(FBU) message. In order to protect FMIPv6, several security protocols have been provided [2] - [5] . Recently, Kempf-Koodli's protocol has been adopted as a security standard for FMIPv6 (RFC 5269) [2] . It provides the public key based strong security by adopting the SEcure Neighbor Discovery (SEND) protocol [6] , which is based on the Cryptographically Generated Address (CGA) method [7] . With the help of the CGA method, a mobile node can tightly bind its care-of address to its handover key. Also, because it is FMIPv6-seamless unlike the protocols proposed in [3] and [4] , it does not result in the additional messages and round trip times. Despite such advantages, it suffers from expensive computational cost and Denial of Service (DoS) attacks because it depends on the SEND protocol. More importantly, it is still vulnerable to redirection attacks since it does not protect the UnsolicitedNeighborAdvertisement(UNA) message like other protocols. In this paper, we propose an FMIPv6 security protocol, which improves Kempf-Koodli's one while keeping its advantages. It is assumed that the MN has a public/private key pair PU MN /PR MN and its address is a CGA, which derived from PU MN . And it is supposed that during the bootstrapping step, the MN shares the message protection secret K(1) with the first access router AR(1) through the Authentication, Authorization, and Accounting (AAA) infrastructure [3] , [8] . This assumption is reasonable because the AAA infrastructure is widely used for the network access authentication in Mobile Internet environment. Moreover, we assume that there is a secure channel between access routers.
Operation
As illustrated in Fig. 1 , this protocol is composed of three phases: handover key negotiation, fast binding update and new network attachment phases.
During the handover key negotiation phase, the MN negotiates a new handover key HK(i) with the current access router AR(i) through its public key PU MN for them to defend against the DoS attack while reducing the heavy computation overhead caused by the asymmetric cryptographic operations. For the HMAC method, a message protection secret K(i), derived from its related handover key and nonces, is introduced. Note that during the bootstrapping step, the first message protection secret K (1) is shared between the MN and the AR(1) with the help of the AAA infrastructure as mentioned above. Once the shared handover key HK(i) has been constructed, the MN starts the fast binding update phase by sending the FBU message to the AR(i) when a link-specific handover event occurs. If the FBU message is valid, the AR(i) can believe that the MN truly owns both CoA(i) and PU MN because it can get HK(i) in the only case that PR MN belongs to itself. With such belief, the AR(i) starts to act as a temporary home agent for the MN while exchanging the HI and HACK messages with the next access router AR(i + 1). Note that the HI message includes the (i + 1)th message protection secret K(i + 1). Thus, the AR(i) allows the AR(i + 1) to securely share K(i + 1) with the MN. After that, the AR(i) returns the MN the FBA message while stating to tunnels the traffic sent to CoA(i) on its link to CoA(i + 1) on the AR(i + 1)'s link. If the FBA message is valid, the MN assumes that data packets are being forwarded to its new location. As soon as the MN handovers to the AR(i + 1)'s link, it announces its attachment by sending the UNA message to the AR(i + 1). This is the new network attachment phase. In order to secure the UNA message, the proposed protocol uses both the digital signature, S IGuna, and the HMAC value, MAC f na. Especially, the digital signature is adopted to provide the handover key independence. When the MN cannot send the FBU message or receive the FBA message on the AR(i)'s link (the reactive mode), the AR(i + 1) performs the fast binding update phase on behalf of the MN before verifying the UNA message.
Analysis
In this section, the proposed protocol is formally analyzed through BAN-logic [9] . After that, the protocol's security properties and computation overhead are discussed.
Formal Verification by BAN-Logic
Since introduced by Burrows, Abadi and Needham in 1989, BAN-logic has become the best-known and widely used method for verifying security protocols due to simplicity and robustness. For details on notations and logical postulates of BAN-logic, refer to [9] . As the first step of this verification, we define the goals as follows:
For the next handover, the validity of K(i + 1) should be believed by both the MN and the AR(i + 1). Because the AR(i), who controls K(i + 1), sends the secret to the AR(i + 1) through their secure channel, we can assume that the AR(i+1) believes that the secret is valid and fresh. Thus, we provide the assumptions A4 and A6 in addition to Goal3. Also, we use the following definition besides the basic rules of BAN-logic. It is clear from the meaning of the definition that it is intuitively true.
Definition1 :
A
The idealized form of the proposed protocol is shown in Fig. 2 . For the converting, we express the HMAC(K, M) operation as < M > K . In the PrRtAdv message, besides HK(i), K(i+1) is added in the encrypted part because that secret can be derived from the handover key. Also, the assumptions are defined as shown in Fig. 3 . Strictly speaking, in the BAN logic, we cannot prove that the public key, PU MN belongs to the MN though it can be verified by the CGA method. Thus, we present A9 and A10 instead. Once the assumptions are made, we can now proceed with the analysis (where R1 denotes the message-meaning rule, R2 denotes the nonce verification rule and R3 denotes the jurisdiction rule). From the RtSolPr message, we derive by:
, R1] From the PrRtAdv message, we derive:
From the FBU message, we derive: (7), A16, R3] From the FBA message, we derive:
, R2] From the UNA message, we derive: (9) , A17, R3] Note that only the right part of the UNA message can leads to the formula (11). However, the left part of the message is required to prove the handover key independence. By the formulas (6), (8) , (11), we can conclude that the proposed protocol achieve the given goals. MN , an attacker cannot fabricate UNA messages and launch session hijacking attacks by just eavesdropping. Note that though the message can be protected by only the HMAC method, the digital signature method is used to protect the proposed protocol even though handover keys are compromised. Like our approach, Kempf-Koodli's protocol can use the digital signature based on the CGA method to protect the UNA messages. However, in this case, its computational costs can be considerabley increased due to the expensive assymetric operations. Table 1 compares the computational cost of the proposed protocol with that of Kempf-Koodli's one. As described in it, while the MN reduces (V+H) at the expense of 3 HM, the AR(i) and AR(i + 1) reduce S at the expense of 3(H+HM).
Computational Cost Comparison
In addition to such an advantage, the proposed protocol exploits the existing messages of the FMIPv6 protocol to present an FMIPv6-seamless structure. Therefore, it does not introduce new signaling messages and additional round trip times.
Conclusion
A new security protocol for FMIPv6 was proposed. The proposed protocol uses the message protection secret to solve the drawbacks of Kempf-Koodli's one. Through the HMAC values computed with this secret, it can prevent the DoS attacks while minimizing the public key operations. Note that the first message protection secret is negotiated between the MN and its first AR with the help of the AAA infrastructure. By using BAN-logic, the proposed protocol's correctness is formally verified. From security analysis and computational cost comparison, we can conclude that the protocol is more secure and efficient than Kempf-Koodli's one.
